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Abstract This article sets out to examine the role of symbolic
and sensorimotor representations in discourse comprehension.
It starts out with a review of the literature on situation models,
showing howmental representations are constrained by linguis-
tic and situational factors. These ideas are then extended to
more explicitly include sensorimotor representations.
Following Zwaan and Madden (2005), the author argues that
sensorimotor and symbolic representations mutually constrain
each other in discourse comprehension. These ideas are then
developed further to propose two roles for abstract concepts in
discourse comprehension. It is argued that they serve as
pointers in memory, used (1) cataphorically to integrate up-
coming information into a sensorimotor simulation, or (2)
anaphorically integrate previously presented information into
a sensorimotor simulation. In either case, the sensorimotor rep-
resentation is a specific instantiation of the abstract concept.
Keywords Language comprehension . Embodied cognition .
Mental models . Language/memory interactions . Abstract
concepts
An influential theoretical development in language comprehen-
sion research of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s was the introduc-
tion of the construct of a mental model or situation model
(Bower & Morrow, 1990; Bransford, Barclay, & Franks,
1972; Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Johnson-Laird,
1983; Kintsch, 1998; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998). The basic idea behind situation models is
that comprehension of a stretch of discourse involves the con-
struction of a mental representation of the state of affairs denot-
ed by that text rather than only a mental representation of the
text itself. The computationally most explicit version of
situation-model theory is Kintsch’s (1988; 1998) construction-
integration model. It is an extension of Kintsch and van Dijk’s
(1978) model of text recall. The key component of these models
is the proposition. The mental representation of a text is concep-
tualized as a network of propositions that are linked via the
arguments that they share. As Kintsch and vanDijk (1978) note,
the proposition is Ba convenient shorthand^ for the mental rep-
resentations that they hypothesized were formed during com-
prehension. In Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model,
the proposition was the central representational unit, although
Kintsch left the possibility open for other forms of mental rep-
resentation, such as spatial representations (Kintsch, 1998).
The event-indexing model
The event-indexingmodel (Zwaan, Langston, &Graesser, 1995;
Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998) is an attempt to specify relations among elements of a
situation model, event representations. The basic unit of the sit-
uation model is an event representation. Events are thought to be
related to one another on (at least) five dimensions: time, space,
entity, causation, and motivation. As each incoming clause is
processed, an event representation is formed and it is integrated
with the event representation(s) currently in working memory
based on its overlap with those representations on each of the
five dimensions. If the event occurs within the same time frame
as the events in working memory, there is overlap on the tem-
poral dimension; if the event takes place within the same spatial
region there is spatial overlap; if it involves the same entity
(person or object), there is entity overlap; if it is causally related
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to the previous event(s) there is causal overlap; and if is part of
the same goal/plan structure, there is motivational overlap.
Two simple assumptions are that these five dimensions are
equally weighted and that their effects are additive. This leads to
two predictions, one about online comprehension and one about
the resulting mental representation in long-term memory. The
more situational overlap the current event has with the contents
of working memory, (1) the easier it should be to process the
clause describing that event, and (2) the stronger the connections
between the current event and the events in working memory
should be in long-term memory. These predictions were sup-
ported in several empirical studies, as was the assumption that
the effects of the dimensions were additive (e.g., Therriault,
Rinck, & Zwaan, 2006; Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, &
Curiel, 1998; Zwaan, Langston, et al., 1995; Zwaan,
Magliano, et al., 1995; see also Radvansky & Zacks, 2014).
More recently, the event-indexingmodel has been extended into
the domain of film understanding (Cutting & Iricinschi, 2015;
Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan, 2001; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, &
Maley, 2010).
Addressing the grounding problem
In 1999 the present author submitted a manuscript on the event-
indexing model. One of the reviewers was quite critical and
remarked: BYou’re talking about events and links, but the events
are just empty nodes.What is IN those event nodes?^Unlike the
present author at the time, the reader will recognize this as an
articulation of the grounding problem (Harnad, 1990).
Barsalou’s (1999) article on the perceptual symbol system pro-
posed a way to address the grounding problem. However, while
the theoretical richness of the article was impressive, empirical
evidence for perceptual symbol systemswas as yet forthcoming.
Attempts to test predictions from perceptual symbol theory led
to two early papers in which predictions from perceptual symbol
theory were pitted against predictions from propositional theory,
which reflected the mainstream of thinking about mental repre-
sentation. FollowingBarsalou (1999), it was hypothesized that if
a sentence implies, but does not explicitly mention, a perceptual
characteristic of an entity, a purely propositional theory would
not predict that that characteristic is represented, but perceptual
symbol theory would. For example, the sentence BThe egg is in
the carton^ does not explicitly state that the egg is whole. If
people form visual representations of objects, however, then
readers should represent the shape of a whole egg and it should
be different when they read BThere was an egg in the skillet.^
Specifically, when asked whether a depicted object was men-
tioned in the just-read sentence, readers should respond more
quickly to a picture of a whole egg than to one of one sunny side
up after reading the first sentence, and vice versa for the second
sentence. These predictions were supported in several experi-
ments (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley,
2002; see Zwaan & Pecher, 2012, for direct replications). These
two studies are only among the first in a large body of research.
The past 15 years have provided a great deal of evidence to
suggest that language comprehension involves sensorimotor
representations (for a recent review of this literature, see
Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, Vigliocco, 2012; for a meta-
analysis of relevant behavioral findings, see Louwerse,
Hutchinson, Tillman, & Recchia, 2015). Most of this work has
used individual words or sentences as stimuli but recent neuro-
imaging research shows that sensorimotor representations are
also activated during the comprehension of discourse (e.g.,
Chow, Mar, Xu, Liu, Wagage, & Braun, 2015; Kurby &
Zacks, 2013; Nijhoff & Willems, 2015).
The interplay between symbolic and sensorimotor
representations
Does this evidence mean that linguistic factors have no role to
play in grounded discourse comprehension? Certainly not. In
the research on the event-indexing model, it was always as-
sumed that textual relations (modeled as argument overlap)
impact the comprehension process, and empirical evidence
showed that they do. In the regression models that were used,
situation model effects were always assessed after linguistic
effects such as argument overlap had been taken into account.
The evidence showed that situational overlap impacted com-
prehension even when textual relations were taken into account
(Zwaan, Langston, et al., 1995; Zwaan, Magliano, et al., 1995).
Continuing this line of thought, later work on grounded cogni-
tion has repeatedly made the point that linguistic factors (such
as co-occurrence of linguistic constructions) play a role in com-
prehension (Taylor & Zwaan, 2009; Zwaan & Madden, 2005;
Zwaan, 2004, 2008). As Zwaan and Madden (2005) noted:
BThis idea that associations between representations are formed
through co-occurrence of linguistic constructions is central to
[our] current theory.^ Others have expressed similar views
(Andrews, Frank, & Vigliocco, 2014; Barsalou, Santos,
Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Dove, 2011; Louwerse, 2011).
One hypothesis is that linguistic and perceptual processes mu-
tually constrain each other (Zwaan & Madden, 2005; Zwaan,
2008) for example, linguistic co-occurrence leads to predictions
of upcoming linguistic constructions and of the associated per-
ceptual representations, while perceptual simulations may lead
to the prediction of upcoming perceptual aspects and the asso-
ciated linguistic constructions.
Abstract concepts in context
Thus far, this review has only focused on concrete informa-
tion. This reflects in part that the author’s own empirical work
has focused on concrete concepts. Most natural discourse
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contains a mixture of concrete and abstract concepts, however.
Recent neuroimaging experiments have shown that the degree
to which sensorimotor information is activated during sen-
tence comprehension depends on the linguistic context. The
same action verb (e.g., Bcut^) will generate more activation in
the (pre)motor cortex when read in a literal context than in a
figurative context (Desai et al., 2011; Raposo, Moss,
Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Schuil, Smits, & Zwaan, 2013;
but see Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009). This body
of studies suggests that the degree to which sensorimo-
tor representations are engaged during language compre-
hension is variable and a function of context (Lebois,
Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; Louwerse, 2011;
Taylor & Zwaan, 2009).
There is reason to assume that abstract concepts are more
sensitive to contextual constraints than concrete concepts
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Schwanenflugel,
1991). For example, although concrete words are typically
comprehended faster than abstract words, this difference dis-
appears when supportive context is offered (Schwanenflugel
& Shoben, 1983). A recent neuroimaging study showed that
when abstract words are presented in an appropriate context,
the same patterns of activation of semantically appropriate
nonlinguistic content occur as with concrete words (Wilson-
Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2013).
The clutch metaphor
What is the mechanism that drives the activation of sensori-
motor representations during language comprehension?
Mahon (2015) introduces the helpful metaphor of a clutch to
conceptualize how sensorimotor representations can be en-
gaged to varying extents in language comprehension. A clutch
is a device that connects a driving shaft (e.g., the motor in a
power drill) to the driven shaft (e.g., the drill itself) and can do
this to varying degrees, meaning that the torque of the motor
gets transferred fully, partly, or not at all to the driven shaft. In
Mahon’s clutch metaphor, symbolic processing is the driving
shaft (doing all the initial processing work) and sensorimotor
representations are the driven shaft, getting involved in the
comprehension process to differing degrees but never driving
the process. As Mahon notes, the clutch metaphor is useful in
that it helps us understand a hallmark of human cognition in
general and language use in particular, our ability to disengage
ourselves from the here and now, which Hockett (1960) called
displacement. However, Mahon’s assumption that symbolic
processing is doing all the relevant work might be premature.
The experiments that are used as evidence that symbolic
representations precede sensorimotor ones typically in-
vestigate activation as a function of the presentation of a
decontextualized linguistic stimulus – a word or a sentence.
This likely biases findings toward the primacy of symbolic
over sensorimotor representations. When all you have is a
word, it makes sense that the first thing to come to mind is
another word. But what if the word occurs in a discourse
context, as is the case outside of psychology experiments
(Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997)? Then there is a represen-
tation in working memory: the active part of the evolving
situation model plus the associated linguistic structures
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Sanford & Garrod, 1981; van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, &
Curiel, 1998). Research using the visual-world paradigm has
provided a substantial body of evidence that nonlinguistic
context has an immediate effect on word and sentence pro-
cessing (e.g., Chambers, Tanenhaus, & Magnuson, 2004;
Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, &
Sedivy, 1995).
It is therefore plausible to assume that as longer stretches of
text are read, more and more sensorimotor representations will
become activated, which will, in turn, activate associated
lexical representations. In such cases, the flow of activation
between symbolic and sensorimotor representations is likely
bidirectional, as Zwaan andMadden (2005) already proposed,
and the two layers of representation mutually constrain each
other to produce fluency in the comprehension process
(Zwaan, 2008).
Taking Mahon’s (2015) proposal one step further, the ap-
propriate metaphor is that of a two-way clutch. Given the
linguistic nature of the stimulus, initial activation will neces-
sarily flow from symbolic representations to sensorimotor
ones and the degree to which this will happen is due to a
number of contextual factors. Once sufficient sensorimotor
context has been accumulated, activation flows both ways,
from the symbolic system to the sensorimotor system and vice
versa. This does not deny the possibility that comprehending a
stretch of discourse text comprehension sometimes may not
involve detailed sensorimotor representations at all, for exam-
ple because the comprehender has limited background knowl-
edge of the topic of the discourse or because or she is not a
proficient user of the language of the discourse.
Comprehension is not an all-or-nothing process. It is fault-
tolerant and may occur at different levels of depth (Taylor &
Zwaan, 2009). In many instances, a shallow symbolic repre-
sentation (the kind of processing many psychology experi-
ments seem to invite) may be sufficient to get by. Taylor and
Zwaan (2009) give the example of someone telling someone
else about a high jumper jumping over a bar and injuring his
neck. Here is a slight extension of it. Someone not proficient
in English may not know the proper contextual meaning of
Bbar^ and may also not know the meaning of Binjure.^ Still,
that person may come away with the understanding that a
male individual jumped over something and something hap-
pened to his neck. This level of understanding might be suffi-
cient in many instances. Someone proficient in English but
with no experience with sports may understand that a high
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jumper jumped over a (high jumping) bar and somehow in-
jured his neck. Clearly this person understands more of the
sentence and, in fact, this level of understanding is sufficient to
answer a simple comprehension question about the sentence
(How did he injure his neck? Answer: By jumping over a bar).
Questions of this kind are often posed in psycholinguistic
experiments. Someone who has actually seen high-jumping
being performed will infer – for example, by activating dy-
namic visual representations – that the high-jumper presum-
ably performed the Fosbury flop (going backwards over
the bar) and landed on his neck, thus injuring it. This
comprehender is able to understand the (correct) causal con-
nection between the jump and the injury and so has achieved a
deeper level of comprehension than the previous
comprehender. Someone who has actually performed the
Fosbury flop will in addition be able to activate relevant motor
and somatosensory representations, thus leading to a yet
deeper, first person, understanding of the sentence. This
comprehender may Bfeel the jumper’s pain.^ The point of this
example is that such a deep level of understanding is often not
necessary Bto get by^ in many situations.
Consider Bransford, Barclay, and Johnson’s (1972) well-
known Bwashing clothes^ scenario. The scenario describes a
sequence of vague actions involving vague objects. Here is
how it starts out: BThe procedure is actually quite simple. First
you arrange things into different groups. Of course, one pile
may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do…^
These sentences are not completely incomprehensible but the
comprehension they afford is severely limited because the
referents of most words are unknown. What are the things
the text mentions and what is the procedure? All we know is
that the things can be arranged in groups (meaning that they
are not affixed to some surface) and that they can be piled up
(meaning that they cannot be spheres or needle-shaped).
However, once the story’s title (Washing Clothes) is provided,
the veil of abstraction is lifted and sensorimotor representa-
tions can be activated. For example, Bpile of things^ can now
be taken to refer to a pile of laundry, for which a visual repre-
sentation can be activated as well as a motor representation of
piling up laundry. There have been neuroimaging studies in-
volving Washing Clothes-type stories (e.g., St. George et al.
1999; Maguire, Frith, & Morris, 1999) but these were con-
cerned with coherence. I am not aware if the relevant experi-
ment has been done but one can conceive of the following one
in which there are two between-subjects conditions. In one
condition, the subjects read the text without title and then are
instructed to reread it with the title. In the second condition
they read the text both times without the title. The prediction is
that there will be more sensorimotor activation in the title
condition than in the control condition. Recent neuroimaging
evidence shows that personal experience with the narrated
events strongly modulates interactions between higher- and
lower-level areas within the visual and motor processing
systems (Chow et al., 2015). Thus, perhaps the neural instan-
tiation of the clutch is as a modulator of the retrieval
and integration of visual and motor knowledge into the evolv-
ing situation model.
Symbolic representations in discourse
comprehension
This analysis points to a potential division of labor between
symbolic and grounded representations in extended discourse.
It is possible that insufficient context is initially provided for
the activation of relevant sensorimotor representations, though
probably mostly not in such an extreme a manner as in the
Washing Clothes case. In such cases symbolic representations
function as placeholders, pointers in working memory that are
part of a network of semantic associations that will be fleshed
out with sensorimotor representations once sufficient context
has been accumulated. In an earlier paper, I provided an ex-
ample of this (Zwaan, 2014), which is developed further here.
When presented out of context (as in many a psychology
experiment) the word Bjustice^ may invoke a variety of rep-
resentations, which differ both between subjects and within
subjects across time (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings theorize that abstract and con-
crete concepts are similar in that they are both representations
of situations. The two differ in that concrete concepts have a
focal entity that is more or less the same across situations,
whereas in abstract concepts, the focus is more diffuse.
I consider this the most promising account of abstract
concepts that is available in the literature. But how does this
play out in discourse?
Consider two cases, many instantiations of which can be
found in newspapers and novels. In the first case, the abstract
term is presented early on in the discourse without much prior
context. Suppose a text starts out with the sentence BToday
justice was served^. At this point, the word justice does not
have a contextually relevant sensorimotor representation asso-
ciated with it because it is not clear what the context is, al-
though it is possible that a (positive) emotional representation
is activated given that abstract words have been found to be
more emotionally valenced than concrete words (Kousta et al.,
2011). Let us further assume that readers adopt a wait-and-see
strategy in cases where the contextual meaning of a word is
unclear and will not commit to a specific sensorimotor simu-
lation, as this might prove contextually inappropriate and re-
covery might be cognitively costly. In such a case the reader
uses the symbolic representation as a placeholder in an active
state in working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), analo-
gous to what presumably occurs in the Bransford et al. (1972)
experiment. This representation is subsequently used by the
comprehension system to integrate subsequent information so
that a situated simulation can be formed. To borrow a
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linguistic term, the abstract concept is used cataphorically,
referring to later content (Gernsbacher & Shroyer, 1989).
The second case is complementary to the first. A text de-
scribes a specific case and court decision and concludes with
the statement BToday justice was served.^ In this case, there is
a specific situation model that is now being labeled with the
word justice. It is not that the word justice gives meaning to
the situation. Rather, its current meaning is instantiated by the
situation.,1 2 This label now serves as a pointer in memory to a
specific instantiation of justice (a sensorimotor simulation)
that can be used in further reference to the situation, either in
the same discourse (assuming the article extends beyond the
labeling) or in additional discourse (e.g., a letter to the editor).
To borrow another term from linguistics, the representation is
used anaphorically, referring to previous content.
Conclusion
In this article, the literature on situation models and mental
simulations has been reviewed in an initial attempt to integrate
the two. I have argued that symbolic representations and the
associations between them interact with sensorimotor repre-
sentations to achieve fluent discourse comprehension.What is
proposed here is a dual role for abstract concepts in discourse
comprehension, inspired by Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings
(2005). On this proposal, abstract concepts in extended dis-
course function as (1) representations in working memory that
serve to integrate multimodal information in a mental simula-
tion of a specific situation, or (2) as representations in memory
that serve as pointers to previously formed situational repre-
sentations such that these can be reactivated at later stages. It is
likely that these cataphoric and anaphoric functions of abstract
concepts are two ends of a continuum and can be operative
simultaneously if an abstract concept is provided midway
through the description of a situation.
Thus, on this account abstract concepts are weakly associ-
ated with a set of sensorimotor representations and their asso-
ciated symbolic representations (e.g., words) that is more di-
verse than that of concrete concepts. They acquire – either
cataphorically or anaphorically – a specific sensorimotor in-
stantiation in a discourse context. When abstract concepts op-
erate cataphorically, their role is to provide a focus to the
comprehension process, much like pronouns have been
shown to do (Gernsbacher & Shroyer, 1989). When they oc-
cur anaphorically, they function as pointers to situational in-
stantiations. To return to Mahon’s (2015) clutch metaphor,
when an abstract concept is used cataphorically, the sensori-
motor system is abruptly disengaged when the abstract con-
cept is introduced, only to be gradually engaged again so that
sensorimotor information can be used to form a situated in-
stantiation of the concept. When an abstract concept is used
anaphorically, the sensorimotor system was engaged all along
and is now associated with a symbolic representation that
functions as a pointer in memory.
There are some obvious limitations to these proposals.
First, they need to be fleshed out further. Second, they might
be more relevant to some types of discourse (e.g., narratives)
than to others (e.g., scientific papers). It would be useful to
take level of situational embeddedness (Zwaan, 2014) into
account for a more complete analysis. Third, the cataphoric
and anaphoric roles are quite possibly not the only roles that
abstract concepts play in discourse. Nevertheless, I hope that
these proposals provide a way forward in theorizing about
grounded discourse comprehension.
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